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Article 5

CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - JETT V. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DisTRICT: THE APPLICABILITY OF MUNICIPAL VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER 42
U.S.C. SECTION 1981
As a result of dicta in Monell v. Department of Social Services 1 stating

that 42 U.S.C. Section 19832 precludes application of the common-law
doctrine of respondeat superior,3 plaintiffs have focused upon 42 U.S.C.
section 19814 as a means to hold a municipality vicariously liable for ra-

cial discrimination. Whereas section 1983 provides a remedy for any
deprivation of a constitutional right under color of law, section 1981 has
a narrower focus; the thirteenth amendment's guarantee against racial
discrimination. 5 The United States Supreme Court has not addressed
the issue of whether section 1981 permits recovery through use of respondeat superior. 6 InJett v. DallasIndependent School District,7 the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit interpreted Monell as also
1 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
For a discussion of the legislative history of § 1983, see infra note 39.
3 The court in Monell held that municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must involve a violation which occurs pursuant to an official policy or custom. 436 U.S. at 694. Justice Brennan noted
that § 1983 requires causation before a defendant could face liability. Id. at 691. Since Monell involved an official municipal policy, the Court's discussion of municipal respondeat superior was
"merely advisory and not necessary to explain the Court's decision." Id. at 714 (Stevens,J., concurring in part). For the Court's reasoning for rejecting municipal vicarious liability under § 1983, see
Id. at 691-95.
For a definition of what constitutes an official policy, see, e.g., Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735
F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per curium) (modifying 728 F.2d 762 (en banc)), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1016 (1985).
4 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to
enjoy the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
For a discussion of the legislative history and purpose of § 1981, see infra note 38.
5 For a discussion of the available causes of actions under §§ 1981 and 1983, see generally
Comment, Developments in the Law - Section 1981, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 29 (1980) (discusses the
legislative histories of §§ 1981 and 1983 and details causes of actions employed in the modem civil
rights movement).
6 In General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982), the Court
reversed a finding of private vicarious liability under § 1981 due to insufficient facts to demonstrate
an agency relationship. Justice O'Connor, however, stated in dissent that "nothing in the Court's
opinion prevents the respondents from litigating the question of the employers' liability under
§ 1981 by attempting to prove the traditional elements ofrespondeat superior." Id. at 404 (emphasis in
original).
7 798 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1986).
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prohibiting municipal vicarious liability under section 1981. This holding runs contrary to the reasoning adopted by the majority of the circuits
and by district courts which allow such recovery.8
Part I of this comment discusses the facts and holdings inJett. Part II
argues that an independent analysis of the language, legislative history,
and purpose of section 1981 shows that municipal vicarious liability is
not precluded in section 1981 actions. Part III suggests that courts
should interpret section 1981 in the context of the modern civil rights
movement, focusing on the necessity to assure the plaintiff adequate
compensation and to deter future violations. Part IV concludes that, in
Jett, the Fifth Circuit adopted an unduly restrictive view of municipal liability under section 1981.
I. Jett v. Dallas Independent School District
Norman Jett, a caucasian, alleged that Frederick Todd, a black principal at South Oak Cliff High School who was employed by the Dallas
Independent School District (DISD), removed him from his position as
South Oak's head football coach based upon his race. 9 In May 1983, Jett
initiated a suit against Todd in his individual and official capacities, and
the DISD, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1983.10
In 1962, after working for the DISD for five years, Jett received an
appointment to the faculty and football coaching staff at South Oak
Cliff.II When Jett became the athletic director/head football coach in
1970, the school's racial composition had shifted from predominantly
8 Springer v. Seamen, 821 F.2d 871, 880-81 (1st Cir. 1987) (Since Monell is peculiar to § 1983
causes of action, its limitations, jurisdictional limitations and causation requirements will not be imposed on § 1981 causes of action.); Leonard v. City of Frankfort Elec. and Water Plant Board, 752
F.2d 189, 194 n.9 (6th Cir. 1985) (In rejecting § 1981 liability for the city, "[tihe district court's
reasoning was clearly deficient in relying solely on Monell, since post-Monell § 1981 decisions clearly
reject this approach."); Abasiekong v. City of Shelby, 744 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1984) (reinstates jury
verdict imposing § 1981 municipal liability); Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
438 U.S. 904 (1977) (city may be liable under § 1981 for misconduct by its police officers); Sethy v.
Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (§ 1981 does not
provide the municipal immunity found by the Supreme Court in Monroe for § 1983 racial discrimination claims); Bouquette v. Clemmer, 626 F. Supp. 46, 48 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (a municipality may be
vicariously liable under § 1981); Lawrence v. Board of Police Commissioners, 604 F. Supp. 1229,
1232 (Mo. 1985) (respondeat superior may be invoked to hold a municipality liable under § 1981);
Caine v. Chicago, 619 F. Supp. 1228, 1232-33 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (respondeat superior claim against the
city is affirmed); Haugabrook v. Chicago, 545 F. Supp. 276, 280-81 (N.D. Il1. 1982) (§ 1981 respondeat superior liability found against municipality); Bell v. Milwaukee, 536 F. Supp. 462, 474 (E.D.
Wis. 1982) (a municipality's § 1981 liability is not limited to an agent's acts done pursuant to his
authority); Jones v. Int'l. Union of Operating Engineers, 524 F. Supp. 487, 491-92 (S.D. Ill. 198 1)
(respondeat superior is applicable to § 1981 causes of action); Croswell v. O'Hara, 443 F. Supp. 895,
898 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (city has respondeat superior liability under § 1981 for police misconduct);
Stewart v. Wappingers Cent. School Dist., 437 F. Supp. 250, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Contra, Lee v.
Wyandotte County, 586 F. Supp. 236, 240 (Kan. 1984) (the county may be liable if a direct link can
be established; otherwise there is no respondeat superior liability for municipal defendants under
§ 1981).
9 Jett, 798 F.2d at 752.
10 Id. The United States Supreme Court held in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transport. Co., 427
U.S. 273 (1976), that white persons may bring a § 1981 claim. Writing for the majority, Justice
Marshall noted that the statute's protection explicitly applies to "all persons." The Court held that
the statute's language, "as is enjoyed by white persons," did not eliminate the prohibition of racial
discrimination against whites. Id. at 285-96.
11 Jett, 798 F.2d at 751.
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white to predominantly black. 12 In 1975, the DISD named Todd principal of South Oak Cliff. 13 A strained working relationship ensued between Todd and Jett over the next seven years.14
The tension prompted Todd to present DISD Director of Athletics
John Kincaide with a written request forJett's removal in March, 1983.15
Shortly thereafter, Jett met with DISD Superintendent Linus Wright and
suggested that Todd's accusations stemmed from his desire to have a
black football coach.16 Wright, however, supported Todd and asked Jett
to relocate voluntarily, while assuring him that "the DISD would take
care of him and find him another position."' 7 At a March 1983 meeting
between DISD officials and Todd, Wright officially approved Todd's
request. 18
The DISD then reassigned Jett to teach, without any coaching responsibilities, at another high school.' 9 On May 5, 1983, the DISD informed Jett of his placement in the "unassigned personnel budget" and
of their intention not to rehire him for the next school year.2 0 At that
point, Jett initiated his suit and subsequently resigned from the DISD on
August 19, 1983.21
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
found, inter alia, racial discrimination by both Todd and the DISD.2 2 The
Fifth Circuit, while affirming Todd's personal liability,2 3 refused to find
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. The two men argued over Jett's faculty meeting attendance record, his methods of
purchasing equipment and his teaching abilities. Much of the antagonism developed out of events
surrounding South Oak Cliff's game against Piano High. Prior to the contest, Jett angered Todd by
making exaggerated statements about his team's ability in a local newspaper. After losing the game,
Jett violated league rules by entering the referees' locker rooms and criticizing two black officials.
Rumors later circulated that the South Oak Cliff coaching staff may have accepted bribes prior to the

game and failed to follow their initial game plan. In a subsequent incident, a newspaper quotedJett
as claiming that only two of his players would meet college football academic eligibility requirements. Id.
15 Id. at 752.
16
17
18
19
20

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The DISD transferredJett to the Security Department and claimed that he could apply for

any available positions. If DISD could not find him an administrative position, it promised Jett a
teaching assignment. Id.
21 Id. On August 4, 1983, the DISD did offerJett a position atJefferson High School as a history
teacher, freshman football coach, and freshman track coach. Id.
22 Id. Thejury also found thatJett suffered violations of his rights to free speech and procedural
due process. It noted that constructive termination from DISD occurred in August, 1983. Damages
were set at $850,000, including $50,000 punitive damages against Todd. Barefoot Saunders, District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, held that the evidence did not support the punitive
damages award. Jett accepted a remittitur ordering $450,000 actual damages and $112,870.45 for
attorney's fees against the DISD. Todd was jointly and severally liable for $50,000 actual damages
and wholly liable for the attorney's fees. Id.
23 In affirming Todd's liability for racial discrimination, the Fifth Circuit relied on McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S- 792 (1973) and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981). The court stated thatJett, as a member of a racial minority at South Oak Cliff, had
established a prima facie case of racial discrimin*ation and created a rebuttable presumption that
discrimination led to his discharge. DISD had supplied legitimate, alternative reasons for its action,

including poor work performance. The jury decided that Todd intentionally discriminated against
Jett. The court found that the continuing conflicts between the two men provided an adequate basis
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the DISD vicariously liable under sections 1981 and 1983.24 The court
did acknowledge the applicability of respondeat superior in section 1981
claims against a private employer. 2 5 The Fifth Circuit, however, interpreted Monell as providing "compelling reasons for distinguishing between private and municipal liability under section 1981."26 Namely, the
court interpreted Monell as allowing municipal vicarious liability for both
sections 1981 and 1983 only on proof that the violation was pursuant to
an "official policy or custom;" 27 because the court found no such official
policy or custom of racial discrimination, the DISD was not vicariously
28
liable for Todd's actions.
II.

Statutory Construction of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981

By analogizing the school district's section 1981 liability to that
available under section 1983, the Fifth Circuit used a method of statutory
construction similar to that unanimously rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Carter.29 In Carter, the district
court first held that the District of Columbia is a "state or territory" as
used in section 1983;3o it applied as binding precedent a case in which
the Supreme Court had decided the same issue for section 1982. 3 1 In
reversing the district court's decision, the Supreme Court held that a
court interpreting related statutes must take into account the effects of
variations in historical context, subject matter, and scope of legislative
power exercised in each enactment. 3 2 The Court then found different
for the jury's decision. 798 F.2d at 756-57. Additionally, Todd's liability for violatingJett's exercise
of free speech was upheld. Id. at 757-58. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded Todd's damages
on these counts for a new trial. Id. at 763.
24 Id. at 753-54. The court also held that the DISD did not violateJett's right to substantive due
process since his contract did not constitute a property interest. In addition, it overturned the jury's
finding of constructive termination because Todd's diminished responsibilities did not make his remaining with DISD intolerable. Id.
25 Id. at 762.
26 Id. at 763.
27 TheJett court stated:
We believe that the Supreme Court's focus in Monell in this connection was not on particular types of "federal" wrongs, but rather was on a particular type of liability for all such
wrongs. The Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1983 and its legislative history indicates that Congress did not impose different types of liability on a municipality based on the
particular "federal" wrong asserted ....
To impose such vicarious liability for only certain
wrongs based on section 1981 apparently would contravene the congressional intent behind section 1983.
Id. at 762 (footnote omitted).
The Fifth Circuit did acknowledge that a municipality may face vicarious liability under Title
VIII. However, the court found that Title VIII covers different constitutional violations than do
sections 1981 and 1983. Id. at 762-63 nn. 13-14.
28 Id. at 760-61.
29 409 U.S. 418 (1972).
30 Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 361 n.3 (1971).
31 Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948). The Fourth Circuit, in Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d
196 (4th Cir. 1961), had also relied on Hurd to establish the status of the District of Columbia in
section 1983 causes of action. Carter notes the different congressional enactments behind each statute. Section 1982 is based on the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 409 U.S. at 421. Section 1981, which the
Jett court interpreted in light of Monell's section 1983 analysis, is also based on the Civil Rights Act of
1866.
32 At first glance, it might seem logical simply to assume, as did the court of appeals, that
identical words used in two related statutes were intended to have the same effect. Never-
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interpretations for
identical language used in both the Civil Rights Act of
33
1866 and 1871.
Although theJett court did not base its holding on the existence of
identical statutory language, it found identical breadth of liability based
on statutory omission.3 4 Despite the Carter requirement of discrete inquiries into the meaning behind each enactment as a threshold determination in statutory analysis, the Jett court posited a uniform municipal
liability for constitutional violations. 35 It did not consider the differences
in context, constitutional sources, and congressional intent between sections 1981 and 1983. An analysis of these factors produces a different
result.
AlthoughJett examined section 1981 in light of Monell's section 1983
analysis,3 6 Monell itself does not require uniform construction of sections
1981 and 1983. The statutes were enacted by different Congresses and
have separate and distinct legislative histories. 3 7 Further, the two statutes derive from different constitutional authority. Section 1981 was enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amendment 38 while section 1983 was
theless, "[w]here the subject matter to which the words refer is not the same in several
places where they are used, or the conditions are different, or the scope of the legislative
power exercised in one case is broader than that exercised in another, the meaning well
may vary to meet the purposes of the law ......
409 U.S. at 418 (quoting Atlantic Cleaners and Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)).
33 409 U.S. at 419.
34 Sections 1981 and 1982 are the modem codifications of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Section 1983 is the modem codification of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Neither § 1981 as interpreted inJett, nor § 1983 as interpreted in Monell, address the issue of vicarious municipal liability.
TheJett court interpreted these omissions so as to preclude vicarious liability.
35 798 F.2d at 760-61.
36 Supra note 27.
37 See, e.g., Carter, 409 U.S. at 423 ("The situation is wholly different, however, with respect to
§ 1983. Unlike § 1982, which derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1983 has its roots in the
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871."); Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1030 (3d Cir. 1977) ("Although
their modem codification in Title 42 may make it appear that section 1981 and section 1983 are
sister provisions of a single act of Congress which ought to be construed together, such is not the
case."); see also Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
38 The legislative history of § 1981 indicates that it was enacted pursuant to the thirteenth
amendment. It was initially codified in section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition
of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and
to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding.
(Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. Reenacted as Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140).
This Act was a response to the circumvention of the thirteenth amendment by Southern legislatures. The Reconstruction Congress found that racist legislation was rendering the guarantees of
the amendment ineffective. For example, Senator Trumbull, the floor manager of the bill, noted
that "[i]n some communities in the South, a custom prevails by which different punishment is inflicted upon the blacks from that meted out to whites for the same offense." CON. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866). See infra note 60.
The intent to enforce the thirteenth amendment was emphasized by Senator Trumbull in his
introductory remarks, who called the measure:
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enacted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment.3 9 Federal courts have
consistently recognized the different constitutional derivations of the two
sections. 40 Since "[d]ifferent problems of statutory meaning are
presented by two enactments deriving from different constitutional
sources," 4 1 an independent analysis of the language, history, and purpose of section 1981 is required to determine the proper scope of any
municipal liability.
A. Language and Structure of Section 1981
Section 1981 does not indicate any congressional intent to exempt
municipalities from vicarious liability. The language refers only to those
"persons" protected as potential plaintiffs under the statute. 42 It contains no language concerning the class of potential tortfeasors. 43 The
absence of such limitation is conspicuous, for if Congress intended any
special delineation of municipal liability, it would have explicitly mentioned it on the face of the enactment. In section 1983, for example,
"person" defines the class that can violate the statute. 4 4 The Jett court
took Monell's analysis of jurisdictional limitations to recovery in civil
The most important... that has been under consideration since the adoption of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery. That amendment declared that all persons in the
United States should be free. This measure is intended to give effect to that declaration and
secure to all persons in the United States practical freedom.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
Congressman Thayer, another proponent of the bill, called it the 'just sequel" and "proper
conclusion" to the thirteenth amendment. "Without this, in my judgment," Thayer said, "that great
act ofjustice will be paralyzed and made useless. With this it will have practical effect, life, vigor and
enforcement." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1161 (1866). For section 1981's grounding in
the thirteenth amendment see e.g ,Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-24 (1972); The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883); Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th
Cir. 1976).
39 Section 1983 finds its roots in the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. Congress enacted this legislation to limit the terrorism of the Klan and other racist groups which had "rendered the courts powerless to punish the crimes they [had] committed." President Grant requested that Congress enact
legislation that would "effectively secure life, liberty, and property and the enforcement of law in all
parts of the United States." The subsequent legislation was presented by Congressman Shellabarger as a bill "to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment of the United States."
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., Ist Sess. 236 (1871) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
The focus of the 1871 Act was not so much on the Klan as on those state officials who refused to
control it. As Justice Douglas wrote in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 176 (1961), the Act was not a
remedy against the Klan, but against "those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or
unwilling to enforce a state law." Thus, while the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was intended to ensure the
broad viability of the thirteenth amendment, the Act of 1871 was enacted to enforce the fourteenth
amendment within the limited factual setting of the denial of rights under color of law. For further
analysis of the constitutional background of § 1983, see Carter, 409 U.S. at 423-29. Section 1983's
roots in the fourteenth amendment have been detailed in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238
(1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961); Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1020 (3d Cir.
1977).
40 See supra notes 38-39 (citing cases).
41 Carter, 409 U.S. at 423.
42 Sethy, 545 F.2d at 1160. "The provisions of § 1981 [regarding liability] however, are not limited to 'persons'; on the contrary, that term refers to those benefited by the enactment. There is no
indication that Congress intended to restrict the class of those liable for § 1981 violations to those
within the § 1983 definition of 'persons.'" Id. at n.5.
43 See supra note 4.
44 Mahone, 564 F.2d at 1030. ("Whereas the word 'person' in section 1983 defines those on
whom liability may be visited, the word 'persons' in section 1981 describes those who are protected
by the statute.")
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rights violations in section 1983 actions and applied that analysis to section 1981 actions, thereby limiting the recovery for victims of that class
of civil rights violations.
The language of section 1981 is sweeping and inclusive, providing
for the right of "all persons" to engage in the statute's protected activities.4 5 Courts have consistently interpreted this language to apply to a
wide range of factual settings.4 6 When a statute is drafted to provide
broad protection and courts have applied it in many different situations,
it is ill-founded to imply a limited remedy when no limitation is contained in the language. 4 7 Had Congress intended limited liability it
would have drafted the statute more narrowly and expressly limited potential defendants.
B.

CongressionalIntent for Section 1981

The rationale supporting vicarious liability under section 1981 rests
in the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Congress intended to
make that original legislation as broad and sweeping as possible. 4 8 During the congressional debates, proponents repeatedly derided a narrow
application of the rights guaranteed in the thirteenth amendment. Senator Trumbull argued that because of such a crabbed interpretation, "the
promised freedom [of the thirteenth amendment] is a delusion. Such
was not the intention of the Congress." 49 Senator Howard exemplified
the support in Congress for wide legislative power to make the amendment effective. "It was in contemplation of [the amendment's] friends
and advocates to give to Congress precisely the power over the subject of
slavery and freedom which is proposed to be exercised by the [Civil
Rights Act of 1866] now under our consideration." 50
The repeated hopes that the Act would "give practical effect" to the
thirteenth amendment 5 1 and wipe out all vestiges of slavery clearly indicate Congress' purpose to enact far reaching, forceful legislation. The
existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and
appropriate remedies. 5 2 Congress did not intend to enforce a sweeping
45 See supra note 4.
46 See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295-96 (1976) (Section 1981
protects both whites and non-whites from racial discrimination); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
174-75 (1976) (Section 1981 prevents exclusion of students from private schools due to race); Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 421 (1968) (1866 Act protects against public and private
discrimination); Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc)
(Section 1981 precludes racially motivated hiring by municipalities and their employees); Hernandez
v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752, 755 (D. Or. 1973) (restaurant's refusal to serve Spanish ,speaking
persons is precluded by section 1981); Sims v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 343 F. Supp.
112, 114-15 (D. Mass. 1972) (a refusal to sell insurance to a black customer is actionable under
section 1981); Grier v. Specialized Skills Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856, 861-62 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (barber
school is precluded from discriminating against applicants by section 1981).
47 See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969) (a narrow construction of
section 1982, another modem codification of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, is inconsistent with the
"broad and sweeping" protection intended by that act).
48 See Comment, supra note 5 at 37-56.
49 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
50 Id.
51 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Thayer).
52 See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969).
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policy goal with severely limited remedies, especially in light of potential
53
municipal liability for tort actions in the 19th century.
Most state political subdivisions in the 19th century were organized
as municipal corporations; 5 4 as such, they could be sued both in contract
and in tort like any other corporation. 5 5 Generally, prior to 1866, courts
were not willing to impose vicarious liability for purely discretionary acts
by public officials, 5 6 but if the municipality through its representative of57
ficial failed to fulfill an absolute duty to the plaintiff it would be liable.
Some courts also allowed recovery against municipalities for acts of city
employees that violated federal or state statutes. 58 Thus, vicarious municipal liability was not an uncommon remedy in the 19th Century; Congress could have explicitly excluded it from the act.
The political climate in the Reconstruction Congress also gives
guidelines as to the legislative intent. Such historical context is necessary
when examining statutory purpose.5 9 The Thirty-Ninth Congress suspected Southern intransigence in the face of reconstruction 6 and was
willing to use broad measures to prevent a return to the old regime of
slavery. 6 1 By citing Monell, the Jett court implied that the Thirty-Ninth
Congress desired a limited remedy; despite the fact that that body was
expressly concerned with rooting out the institutionalized slavery of the
South.
C.

Implied Repeal

The questionable extension of section 1983 liability to section 1981
results from conflicting interpretations of the failure of the Sherman
53 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637-644 (1980) (a discussion of municipal
liability available in the mid 19th century).
54 See DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 9-10 (2nd ed. 1877).
55 See Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and Private Functions in Respect to the
Common-Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations, 16 OR. L. REv. 250 (1936); DILLON, supra note 54 at
§§ 749-802.
56

See BLACK, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS (1893); DILLON, supra note

54 at §§ 774-777.
57 Dillon supra note 54 at § 778, n. I (citing cases). In Owen v. City of Independence, the Court
held that a municipality has no discretion to violate duties imposed on it by the Federal Constitution.
445 U.S. at 649. Therefore, although the DISD could have removedJett from his position under its
discretionary powers, it had an absolute duty not to discriminate against him on the basis of his race.
58 See, e.g., Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 294, 303 (1865) (state subdivision enacted provision violating the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution); New York v. Ramson, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 487 (1859) (patent violation). See also Barnett, supra note 55 at 251-52 n.7
(1936) (citing cases); Note, Streets, Change of Grade, Liability of Cities, 30 AM. ST. REP. 835, 837 (1893)
(citing cases).
59 District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 420 (1973).
60 As Senator Trumbull noted:
Since the abolition of slavery, the legislatures which have assembled in the insurrectionary
States have passed laws relating to the freedmen, and in nearly all the states they have
discriminated against them. They cling to their customary rights, subject them to severe
penalties and still impose upon them the very restrictions which were imposed upon them
in consequence of the existence of slavery, and before it was abolished.
CONG. GLOBE 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
61 See F. FRANKFURTER &J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 64 (1928); C. WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE UNITED STATES HISTORY 177-219 (1928); See also, the Feedmens Bureau

Bill U.S., Mar. 3, 1865, c. 90, 13 Stat. 1353 (subsequently vetoed by President Andrew Johnson)
which extended federal military involvement in particularly discriminatory communities.
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Amendment to become part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The Sherman Amendment would have imposed liability on a municipality for
damage done by private persons "riotously or tumultuously assembled." 62 Proponents of a limited section 1981 remedy have argued that

even if municipal liability had existed from the time of the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the failure of the Sherman Amendment in
1871 represented an "implied repeal" of municipal liability under section 1981.63
Implied repeal, as a canon of statutory construction, is not favored
by the courts; it should be sparingly used.r4 When no express repeal is
contained in a statute, no implied repeal occurs unless the two acts in
question are in irreconcilable conflict or "unless the later statute covers

the whole ground occupied by the earlier and is dearly intended as a
substitute for it, and the intention of the legislation to repeal [it is] clear
and manifest."' 6 5 A court must find a "positive repugnancy between the
62

The Sherman Amendment provided:
That if any house, tenement, cabin, ship, building, barn, or granary shall be unlawfully or
feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned or destroyed, wholly or in part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and
with force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or killed by any persons riotously
and tumultuously assembled together or if any person shall unlawfully and with force and
violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, with intent to deprive any person of any right conferred upon
him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to deter him or punish him for
exercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or previous condition or servitude, in
every such case the county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to the person or persons damnified by such
offense, if living, or to his widow or legal representative if dead; and such compensation
may be recovered in an action on the case by such person or his representative in any court
of the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district in which the offense was committed, such action to be in the name of the person injured, or his legal representative, and
against said county, city, or parish, and in which action any of the parties committing such
acts may be joined as defendants. And any payment of any judgment, or part thereof unsatisfied, recovered by the plaintiff in such action, may, if not satisfied by the individual defendant therein within two months next after the recovery of such judgment upon
execution duly issued against such individual defendant in such judgment, and returned
unsatisfied, in whole or in part, be enforced against such county, city, or parish, by execution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or any other proceeding in aid of execution or
applicable to the enforcement ofjudgments against municipal corporations; and such judgment shall be a lien as well upon all moneys in the treasury of such county, city, or parish, as
upon the other property thereof. And the court in any such action may on motion cause
additional parties to be made therein prior to issue joined, to the end that justice may be
done. And the said county, city, or parish may recover the full amount ofsuchjudgment, by
it paid, with costs and interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal or accessory in such riot, in an action in any court of competentjurisdiction. And such county, city,
or parish, so paying, shall also be subjugated to all the plaintiff's rights under such
judgment.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 745, 755 (1871).
63 See Sethy v. Alameda County Water District, 545 F.2d at 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
The court recognizes yet rejects this line of argument. See also Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018,
1031 (3rd Cir. 1977).
64 United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) ("It is a cardinal principle of construction
that repeals by implication are not favored. Where there are two acts upon the same subject the rule
is to give effect to both if possible."). See also United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 299 (1935)
(Cardozo, J., dissenting, quoting Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878) ("Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond
a rational doubt."))
65 Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S. 596, 601-12 (1882).
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provisions of the new law and those of the old." 66 It cannot merely establish that a subsequent 67law covers "some or even all" of the cases provided for by the old law.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 does not expressly repeal the Civil
69
Rights Act of 1866.68 The two statutes differ in constitutional origin,
legislative history, and purpose. 70 Clearly, the subject matter of the statutes do not overlap. Under the tests for implied repeal laid out by the
Supreme Court, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 fails to represent an implied
repeal of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
The Sherman Amendment involved vicarious liability for the acts of
third parties in the course of riots and disturbances. 7 1 Section 1981 municipal respondeat superior, however, is founded on the actions of municipal employees, 72 whose acts can be directly influenced and
sanctioned by the municipal employer. 73 Commentators have argued
that the Sherman Amendment failed mainly because most municipalities
74
in 1871 could not prevent prohibited activities by its employees.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of implied re76
peal, 7 5 several lower courts have rejected this argument.
Clearly, the legislative debates on section 1983 did not impliedly repeal section 1981. Carter explicitly rejected such impression of the legislative history of one statute onto another. 7 7 YetJett did not apply this
holding when it implied the existence of uniform types of municipal liability under sections 1981 and 1983. TheJett court instead stated that
"to impose such vicarious liability for only certain wrongs based on section 1981 apparently would contravene the congressional intent behind
section 1983."78
66 Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342, 362-63 (1842).
67 Id.
68 See Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d at 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
69 See supra notes 38-39.
70 Id. As has been noted, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was intended to be sweeping legislation of
great effect, applying to private and public acts of discrimination. See also supra note 40. It does not
contain the "conduct under color of law" limitations of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
71 See text of Sherman Amendment, supra note 62.
72 Justice Brennan himself admits in Monell that "the fact that Congress refused to impose vicarious liability for the wrongs of a few private citizens does not conclusively establish that it would
similarly have refused to impose vicarious liability for the acts of a municipality's employees." 436
U.S. at 694 n.57.
73 See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
74 See Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of Municipal Liability in Federal Courts, 51
TEMP. L. Q. 409, 413 n.15 (1978) (Discussing in part the lack of municipal police power in 19th
century America).
75 See supra note 6.
76 "Nothing in the legislative history of section 1983 indicates that Congress' concern with municipal liability under that section extended to municipal liability under every prior federal civil
rights act." Mahone, 564 F.2d at 1031. "[T]here is... no 'positive repugnancy' between the Act of
1866 and the Act of 1871 that would force a conclusion that passage of the latter impliedly repealed
the former." Sethy, 545 F.2d at 1161. See also Garner v. Giarnsso, 571 F.2d 1330, 1338-41 (5th Cir.
1978); Campbell v. Gadsen County Dist. School Bd., 534 F.2d 650, 654 n.8 (5th Cir. 1974).
77 If Monell is read to apply § 1983 analysis to § 1981, as the Jett court did, Justice Brennan,
author of the Monell opinion, would be overruling sub silentio his own Carter opinion.
78 798 F.2d at 762.
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III.
A.

Policy Considerations

Interpreting Section 1981 in a Modern Context

Section 1981 provides no explicit language concerning the scope of
municipal liability. 79 The Reconstruction Congress, however, clearly in80
tended a broad statutory protection for racial discrimination victims.
In any section 1981 claim, courts should adhere to this intent. As Justice
Stevens remarked in Runyon v. McCrary,8 1 courts must interpret
section
82
1981 in terms of "the prevailing sense of justice today."
Courts have consistently applied vicarious liability in section 1981
suits against private employers.8 3 The legislative history of section 1981
does not differentiate between municipalities and private citizens with respect to potential liability. 8 4 Given the increased importance of section
1981 in the modem civil rights era,8 5 courts should focus upon the underlying policies behind respondeat superior, including compensation,
deterrence, and allocation of loss.8 6 Rather than undertaking such an
analysis, the Fifth Circuit inJett relied solely upon Monell's considerably
criticized 8 7 rejection of section 1983 respondeat superior.
B.

Compensation and Loss Spreading

The denial of recovery via municipal respondeat superior under section 1981, as espoused inJett, substantially hinders the plaintiff's ability
to sue a solvent defendant. To hold a municipality liable, the plaintiff
79 See Comment, supra note 5, at 206.
80 See supra note 38.
81 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
82 Id. at 191 (Stevens, J.,concurring).
83 See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979). In that case, the Ninth
Circuit held:
Title VII and § 1981 define wrongs that are a type of tort, for which an-employer may be
liable. There is nothing in either act which even hints at a Congressional intention that the
employer is not to be liable if one of its employees, acting in the course of his employment,
commits a tort. Such a rule would create an enormous loophole in statutes.
Id. at 213.
84 See Comment, supra note 5, at 206.
85 Id. at 64-100 (In the modern civil rights era, plaintiffs suing under § 1981 have included
Blacks, Whites, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Slavs, aliens and Jews.)
86 See R. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS, § 69 (5th ed. 1984) (The modern justification for vicarious liability involves a deliberate allocation of the risk, requiring employers to carefully monitor employee activity.)
87 See Blum, supra note 74 at 413 n.15 (suggesting that reliance on the Sherman amendment is
improper); Katz, MunicipalLiability under Section 1983 and the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior... A System
of More CertainJustice, 16J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATION INPUBLIC SECTOR 15, 17 (1987) (claiming that
respondeat superior under § 1983 ensues full compensation and furthers deterrence); Schnapper,
Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 CoLum. L. REV. 213, 215 n. 15 (1979) (criticizing the Court's
analysis in Monell of the Sherman amendment); Note, Section 1983 MunicipalLiability and the Doctrineof
Respondeat Superior, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1979) (criticizing the reliance on the Sherman amendment and suggesting policy reasons for § 1983 respondeat superior); Note, Monell v. Department of
Social Services: One Step Forwardand a HalfStep Back for MunicipalLiability Under Section 1983, 7 HoFsTRA L. REV. 893, 921 (1979) (suggesting that the Court's analysis in Monell of vicarious liability is
"poorly reasoned").
Many of the policy considerations, such as deterrence and compensation, raised against Monell
are also applicable to the denial of § 1981 respondeat superior.
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faces the arduous task of proving that the violation involved an "official
88
policy or custom."
In a suit against the offending employee, the jury may sympathize
with the economic burden which a damage award imposes on one person.8 9 A defendant may also lack adequate insurance coverage against
such judgments. 90 Statutes indemnifying municipal employees have
often failed to alleviate this burden. 9' Even when indemnification is
present, the jurors often lack notice of the indemnification and base their
award calculations on the defendant's limited assets. 9 2 A cause of action,
furthermore, has minimal value when the municipal employee is judg93
ment proof.
Municipal respondeat superior under section 1981 allows the dam94
age award to reflect more accurately the harm inflicted on the plaintiff.
A municipality possesses the ability to allocate its losses among the citizenry and diminish the potential monetary impact of adverse judgments. 9 5 Simple fairness dictates that the municipality, not the victim of
88 See Comment, supra note 5, at 208.
89 See Katz, supra note 87 at 17 ("[T]he jury will surmise that the officer's pocketbook will be
limited by a small salary and they are reluctant to impose liability on the employee for this reason").
90 See, e.g., F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.1 (1956) ("the public employee...
must bear alone the full weight of the losses he causes unless some provision is made to protect him
by insurance."); Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 CoLuM. L. REV. 1175,
1190 (1977).
A state may enact a provision dealing with the insurance coverage for municipal employees. See,
e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-16.5-18(a) (West 1987 Supp.) ("A political subdivision may purchase
insurance to cover the liability of itself or its employees.")
91 See Bermann, supra note 90, at 1191 ("Virtually every existing right of indemnity enjoyed by
public officials is subject to exclusions not only for action beyond the outer perimeters of their authority, but also for egregious actions within those perimeters." [sic])
92 See Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposalsto Strengthen the 1983 DamageRemedy for Law Enforcers Misconduct, 87 YALE LJ. 447, 456-57 (1978) ("The jurors, not informed of indemnification, think
the officer will personally have to pay any damages ......
93 See Comment, supra note 5, at 206.
94 The Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), held that any
violation of a federally protected right incurs all necessary remedies to the victim. However, the
Court stated in Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), that a municipality may not
face punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Justice Blackmun distinguished between remedies
aiming to compensate and those intended to punish saying, "Compensation was an obligation properly shared by a municipality itself, whereas punishment properly applied to actual wrongdoers." Id.
at 263.
Boyd v. Shawnee, 522 F. Supp. 1115 (D.Kan. 1981) held that Facts Concerts does not preclude the
levying of punitive damages in a § 1981 claim against a municipality. Boyd relied on dicta in Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975), which stated that "[ain individual who
establishes a cause of action under section 1981 is entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages." Also, Boyd emphasized the
differing histories of sections 1983 and 1981. 522 F. Supp. at 1115. See supra notes 38-39.
The First Circuit, in Heritage Hombs of Attleboro, Inc. v. Seekonk Water Dist., 670 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1120 (1982), rejected Boyd's analysis and held that Facts Concerts also applies to § 1981. The court reiterated the concern expressed in Facts Concerts that punitive damages
would impose unbearable financial constraints on a municipality and severely hinder decision making. 670 F.2d at 3. The majority of courts have also adopted the HeritageHomes reasoning. See, e.g.,
Walters v. Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135 (11 th Cir. 1986); Poolaw v. Adanarko, 738 F.2d 364 (10th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985); Molly v. Naperville, 571 F. Supp. 668 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Perry
v. County Club Hill, 607 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. Mo. 1983); Bell v. Milwaukee, 536 F. Supp. 462 (E.D.
Wis. 1982).
95 Given a municipality's deep pocket, the use of vicarious liability has been advocated by
commentators:
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racial discrimination, bear the financial burden of discrimination occa96
sioned by the municipality's employee.
C.

Deterrence

Given that a municipality depends upon agents to implement its operations, allowing section 1981 respondeat superior liability would deter
future violations. 9 7 The municipality would then undertake more diligent administrative supervision, threatening employees who practiced
discrimination with sanctions such as termination, suspension, wage reduction or reassignment. 98 Even if the offending official remained unidentified, respondeat superior would deter future violations by
guaranteeing an aggrieved party access to federal court. 9 9
IV.

Conclusion

TheJett court's merger of the congressional intent and remedies of
sections 1981 and 1983 fails to recognize several important factors.
First, the different constitutional origins and legislative intent of the statutes make merger unreasonable. Furthermore, Carter precludes such an
analysis. Likewise, the lack of clear repugnance between the statutes
leaves no grounds for implied repeal. Thus theJett court's application of
Monell's section 1983 analysis rejecting vicarious liability under section
1981 is unsupportable. Only when section 1981 is allowed to stand on
its own language, history, and purpose, can its true scope of liability be
found.
James F. Basile
PaulineM. Lavelle
Steven M. Richard
The absence of the government's vicarious liability also means little assurance on recovery
to the victim of injurious official action. Since neither his master nor his supervisor shares
the officer's liability, any recovery must come from the financially weakest link in the chain.
Such a principle of liability may be likened to an inverted pyramid; from a viewpoint which
stresses the importance of compensation and wide distribution of losses among the beneficiaries of the enterprise that causes them, the present system is well nigh the worst that can
be imagined.
F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 29.9 (1956).
See also G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (deep pocket allows the risk to belong to

the party most capable to pay). But see Young, Tort Judgments Against Cities: The Sky's the Limit, 1983
DEr. C.L. REv. 1509. ("As Mayor, I see, almost on a daily basis, taxpayer dollars wasted, in ever
increasing amounts of litigation, settlements and judgments arising out of tort claims against
municipalities.")
96 See Comment, supra note 5, at 210. (Restrictive municipality liability under § 1981 fails to deal
with racial discrimination, "an area of preeminent national concern.")
97 See Note, Section 1983 MunicipalLiability and the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior, supra note 87, at
954.
98 See Bermann, supra note 90, at 1198. ("[P]ublic officials respond at least as favorably to the
direct and immediate service related sanctions as they do to the threat of litigation and eventual
liability in damages.")
99 See Comment, supra note 5, at 208 (without § 1981 vicarious liability, numerous claims would
not be brought to'court).
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Addendum
In Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 837 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir.
1988), the 5th Circuit denied NormanJett's motion for a rehearingen banc. In its
opinion the court explained its rationalefor precludingmunicipal respondeatsuperior
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
The court first dismissedJett's argument that Garner v. Giarusso, 571 F.2d
1330 (5th Cir. 1978), was controllingprecedent in the 5th circuit. 837 F.2d at
1245. The issues in Garner concerned whether municipalitieswere wholly exempted
from section 1981 liability.
Next, the court rejected section 1981 vicarious municipal liability based on its
understanding of Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1982), which
rejected qualified municipal respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
as unable to "co-exist with municipal respondent superior liability.. .. " 837

F.2d at 1246.
Finally, the fifth circuit adhered to its understandingthat Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), controlled vicarious municipal liability in section 1981 causes of action. 837 F.2d at 1246-48.

